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ASYMMETRIES IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS 
AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND 
ENEPRI OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 1 
DANIEL GROS AND CARSTEN HEFEKER* 
Introduction 
Since the advent of the euro, Europe or rather the European Central Bank (ECB) has 
had to deal constantly with a dilemma: monetary policy has been unified, at least for the 
12 member countries of the euro area, but labour markets have not. At the same time, 
the strictures of the Stability and Growth Pact mean that for many countries fiscal policy 
is no longer available as an instrument to stimulate output and employment. This 
renders the ECB’s problem even more acute, because it increases the burden on 
monetary policy to get the economy going, while it is faced with countries that are 
clearly asymmetric in terms of their labour markets. Thus their need for or their benefits 
from a more expansionary monetary policy are likely to differ considerably.  
The question of how to tailor monetary policy under such circumstances will become 
even more relevant when the euro area Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is 
enlarged in a few years time. The new members will be characterised by even more 
asymmetries  vis-à-vis the current members than the latter now exhibit among 
themselves. 
The present paper addresses some of the key issues the ECB would have to address to 
make the best of this combination of asymmetric labour markets and a common 
monetary policy. Research on these issues is widely scattered because both labour 
market and monetary policy specialists mainly just look at their own field. Hence, one 
purpose of this paper is to bring together two strands of the literature.  
The preliminary results suggest that the ECB may be well advised to reconsider its 
decision-making process. Further, since these asymmetries would pose less of a 
problem if labour markets were flexible and adapted more or less smoothly to changes 
in the economic environment, it is also important to analyse how far the attempts to 
liberalise European labour markets have progressed.  
We therefore begin this paper with a long-term overview of the development of 
European labour markets in terms of wage-setting and unemployment, and the 
convergence among member countries. The main conclusion is that despite some 
convergence in wage-setting among the member countries, the outcomes of wage-
setting are far from having sufficiently converged. This is particularly the case if one 
compares the rates of employment/unemployment and the composition of the active 
labour force across member states. We conclude from this first section that there must 
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still be significant asymmetries in the translation of wages into employment. Thus, 
labour markets in Europe still work asymmetrically. 
We then address the asymmetries in EMU labour markets and the modest attempts to 
liberalise them. In describing the differences in more detail, we draw on a larger 
research project of ENEPRI and the papers that have been presented at a workshop on 
“EMU and Asymmetries in Labour Markets”. These papers, which are briefly 
summarised here, provide a more finely grained view on how far and to what extent 
European labour markets still differ. Since one way to adapt to a common monetary 
policy would be to have more flexible labour markets, which need not rely on active 
monetary policy to adjust to shocks, we ask whether recent attempts to liberalise 
European labour markets have been successful. Unfortunately, there is little evidence 
that this is the case.  
We finally address the implications these asymmetries have for monetary policy. How 
should the ECB react to the asymmetries it faces and upon what information should it 
base its decisions? How should developments in individual countries be taken into 
account by the governing board of the ECB? Some preliminary theoretical results 
suggest that the ECB would be well advised to reconsider the way it aggregates national 
developments. Our results suggest that it should place more weight on strong 
asymmetries and take more account of strong deviations from the simple average than it 
presumably does at the moment. Therefore, we also briefly discuss type of ECB 
structure in which this could best be achieved. The study concludes by drawing some 
policy implications. 
1.  Long-term developments in European labour markets 
1.1  Wages  
In the first part of this paper, our aim is to examine the degree to which European labour 
markets have converged over recent years, especially at the level of employment. Since 
employment is, according to theory, largely driven by the costs of labour, we first 
document this development. Here, not only do nominal and real wages play a role, but 
the effective wages, including non-wage labour costs and the wage share are also 
important. Therefore these are documented as well. 
In most cases, we adopt a long-term perspective because in our view, the period of low 
inflation and fixed exchange rates of the 1960s can provide valuable insights for the 
future under the EMU. In most cases we have also included the UK in our empirical 
analysis. Our results suggest that the UK is not much different from the large euro-area 
countries in terms of wage-setting, but that there has been some divergence more 
recently. 
Nominal and real wage convergence 
There has clearly been convergence in the evolution of nominal wages in Europe. 
Figure 1 shows five-year averages (to even out short-term fluctuations) in nominal wage 
growth for the four largest member states and the euro area average, excluding Greece 
(all data are taken from the AMECO-database). It is apparent that the (West) German 
values have consistently been the lowest throughout the entire period considered here: 
1961-1999. It is also apparent that the dispersion across countries was rather low during ASYMMETRIES IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND 
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the 1960s (when exchange rates were fixed), but increased dramatically during the 
1970s. The 1980s saw a period of slow convergence and the dispersion has actually 
returned during the last period to the low level of the 1960s. The divergence during the 
1970s was due to the different policy choices that were made at that time in reaction to 
the first oil crisis. Similarly the general acceptance of price stability as an overriding 
goal for monetary policy has now led to convergence on low-wage inflation. 
Figure 1. Growth in nominal wages 
Not only is the dispersion across countries lower now, but the average wage increases 
are also lower than they were during the 1960s. From this simple perspective, wage 
developments in recent years are more compatible with price stability than in earlier 
periods.  
Nominal wage developments are not, of course, a sufficient indicator because they must 
be seen in conjunction with productivity. Hence we now turn to real wage 
developments. Figure 2 presents real wages (nominal wages deflated by the Consumer 
Price Index [CPI]) over the same period and for the same countries as above. (Looking 
at wages deflated by the GDP deflator, Figure 3, which gives real wage costs, yields 
broadly similar results since, as shown below, these two price indices tend to move 
together over long time horizons.) 
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Figure 2. Growth in real compensation per employee (using the CPI deflator) 
 
Figure 3. Growth in real compensation per employee (using the GDP deflator) 
 
-0.01 
0 
0.01 
0.02 
0.03 
0.04 
0.05 
0.06 
0.07 
0.08 
0.09 
1961-64  1965-69 1970-74  1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99  2000-02
WD   FR   IT   UK   E11
0 
0.01 
0.02 
0.03 
0.04 
0.05 
0.06 
0.07 
0.08 
1961-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99  2000-02
WD   FR   IT   UK   E11ASYMMETRIES IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND 
 5 
It is interesting to note that during the 1960s, there was considerable divergence. The 
two outliers of the early 1960s have traded places: during the period of 1961-1964, Italy 
had by far the highest real wage increases and the UK had the lowest. The difference 
was over 5% (on average during a five-year period, which means a cumulative 
difference of over 25%). By contrast, during the late 1990s, Italy showed the lowest real 
wage increase (close to zero) whereas the UK showed the highest, with about 2.5%. But 
not only did these two countries trade places, over time a general convergence (even 
neglecting the UK) has occurred. Real wages now evolve much more in line than they 
did during previous periods. If one discounts the Italian value for the second half of the 
1990s, it appears that real wages in the EU economies are now moving very closely 
together.1 This evolution, in most simple economic models, would also imply that 
unemployment in the countries moves more closely together than before – whether that 
is indeed the case is scrutinised in the following section. 
A changing relationship between nominal and real wages 
In an environment of stable prices, nominal wage increases also translate into real wage 
increases. This is compatible with equilibrium in the labour market only if productivity 
grows correspondingly. It is well known that productivity growth has slowed 
considerably since the 1960s; one would thus expect that the relationship between 
nominal and real wages has changed over time. Figure 4 shows that during the 1960s, 
nominal wages translated almost one to one into real wages (the simple correlation 
coefficient is equal to 0.85), but this is no longer the case.  
Figure 4. Patterns in the relationship between real and nominal wages 
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  The lower average growth-rate of real wages is, of course, just a reflection of the slowdown in 
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During the 1970s, there seems to be no relationship between real and nominal wages 
(the correlation coefficient for this decade drops to 0.16). The same can be said for the 
1980s, except that nominal wage growth is on average much lower (the correlation 
coefficient is slightly higher than that of the 1970s, at 0.33). The last decade seems to 
see a certain return to the patterns of the 1960s, as price stability and moderate growth 
allow nominal wage gains to be translated into real ones as well (the value of the 
correlation coefficient for the 1990s is 0.59). 
Real wages are, on the other hand, the costs that firms have to pay. If one looks at 
wages as costs, one should deflate them with output (value-added) prices. If one looks at 
the living standard that wages permit, one has to deflate them with the CPI. These two 
points of view lead to different results only if there is a difference between the evolution 
of the GDP deflator and the CPI. A difference between these two indices could also 
become important because the ECB and labour unions (i.e. labour supply) look mainly 
at the CPI, whereas one would presume that labour demand is more affected by wages 
deflated by the GDP deflator. Figure 5 shows the ratio of the CPI/GDP deflator.  
Figure 5. Ratio of the CPI/GDP deflator (1995=1) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
productivity observed in most industrialised countries. 
Figure 5: Ratio, CPI/GDP deflator (1995=1)
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Since consumption accounts for over 60% of GDP on average, one would expect the 
GDP deflator and the CPI to move closely together, unless the prices for investment and 
intermediate goods have a consistently different evolution. The data show that indeed, 
over the long term, these two indices tend to move together.  
Since the mid-1980s, there has been little net movement in this ratio for most countries, 
but recently, the CPI has tended to increase somewhat more than the GDP deflator, by 
about 0.5% p.a. If this trend were to continue, it would imply that for an inflation rate 
measured by the CPI of below 1%, the GDP deflator would have to be flat or even 
declining (as happened in Germany during 2000). But it is not clear what one should 
expect in the future, because until around 1995, the movement had been in the opposite 
direction. 
The share of wages in the GDP is another way to look at real wages. Figure 6 
documents the evolution of the wage share since 1960. It is apparent that there are still 
considerable differences across member countries and that there has only been limited 
convergence; for example the UK and Italy have not converged with the other European 
countries. In particular, the UK diverges after around 1998. 
 
Figure 6. Adjusted wage shares, overall economy 
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Will there be changes in the wage-setting? 
The wage share indicator also reflects, to a certain degree, the relative political strength 
of capital and labour. Some authors, like Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), attribute the 
decrease of the wage share to changing union attitudes. In a very detailed analysis of 
unionisation in Europe, Booth et al. (2001) observe a decline in union weight in wage-
setting, which would be consistent with Blanchard and Wolfers’ (2000) interpretation of 
the evolution of the wage share.  
Conversely, de Serres, Scarpetta and de la Maisonneuve (2000) show that the decrease 
of the wage share up to 1998 is to a large extent due to the effects of employment 
composition, and that in some industries the wage share has indeed increased, especially 
in Germany. Hence, it is the change in the sectoral mix towards activities that are less 
unionised and account for lower wage shares that largely explains the wage moderation 
observed during the 1980s and early 1990s. If the sectoral structure has changed 
towards sectors where wage shares are low and/or the sectors with high wage shares 
have declined, they should report an overall decrease in wage shares, without 
necessarily lowering the wage shares within the sectors. This would then explain why 
employment has not increased despite the perceived decrease in wage shares.2 
They also show that for a sample of European countries and the United States, the result 
is in fact that the downward trend in wage shares is dominated by composition effects. 
Looking only at the business sector and excluding government and agriculture, the 
decline in the raw wage share is reduced or eliminated for the US, France and Italy. For 
Germany, this adjusted wage share even shows an upward trend. It is only in the cases 
of Belgium and the Netherlands that the correction does not change the trend 
significantly.  
The reasons for such results can be detected in the growing importance of the business, 
insurance and financial services sector, which is a relatively low-wage share sector 
owing to the high capital intensity of this sector combined with a higher than average 
human capital intensity. This evidence is consistent with the argument that there has 
been a shift in Europe towards technologies/activities that are biased against unskilled 
labour, and/or an increase in the supply of highly skilled labour. Germany is the only 
country where the level of the wage share in manufacturing was higher in 1995 than in 
1975, which explains why the adjusted wage share has even increased. Because this 
sector has shrunk more significantly over time than elsewhere, it may be a partial 
explanation why the rise in that sector’s wage share is less visible in the aggregate data. 
The question is, of course, whether the apparent wage moderation that has been taking 
place until very recently could also be a sign of a fundamental shift towards wage 
restraint? One of the factors leading to wage moderation until 1999 could have been the 
restrictions imposed by the nominal convergence criteria established by the Maastricht 
                                                 
2
 Another interesting explanation for this may be that labour income is increasingly being substituted by 
non-financial compensation (probably due to high tax rates on labour income) in the form of stock-
options and payroll saving schemes that blur the distinction between wage and capital income (see de 
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Treaty in the run-up to the EMU. It could be argued that unions moderated their wage 
demands to avoid being seen as the culprits of a possible failure to join the EMU.  
If this was the case, there are reasons to fear that wage moderation will not last now that 
the EMU is fully in place and the incentives built into the wage determination process 
change. There are reasons to expect both a higher and a lower wage-pressure as a result 
of the common monetary policy (see, for instance, Calmfors, 1998 and Grüner and 
Hefeker, 1999). Consequently the effects of the EMU on structural unemployment are 
controversial and depend on a whole set of parameters representing different 
combinations of nominal rigidity, real-wage rigidity, bargaining structure and workers’ 
bargaining power, and the European Central Bank’s objective function (see Bentolila 
and Saint-Paul, 2000).  
So far, most of the work on this question has been purely theoretical, given that the 
EMU has not been in operation long enough to allow an empirical test. Horn and 
Persson (1988) have argued that a fixed exchange-rate (or a monetary union) makes 
unions aware of the fact that devaluations are no longer available as a safety valve for 
large wage increases. Hence, unions will have to become more moderate in their wage 
demands to avoid an increase in unemployment. Austria could be cited as the prime 
example of this argument, where the long-standing credible peg to the German mark has 
brought social partners to adapt their wage agreements to this constraint (Hochreiter and 
Winckler, 1995). 
Nevertheless, others (Grüner and Hefeker, 1999, and Cukierman and Lippi, 1999) have 
argued that delegating monetary policy to a new agent, the ECB, can increase wage 
demands from labour unions and ultimately lead to higher inflation and unemployment 
as well. Unions may no longer perceive a direct link between their demands and the 
inflationary response of the central bank, because any single union (even if highly 
centralised at the national level) is only a negligible part of the overall monetary union. 
Thus, the expected inflationary response of the ECB to national wage demands is 
lowered, allowing higher real wages in the perception of the union. The union no longer 
needs to fear that high nominal wages will lead to higher inflation as well, which allows 
the union a better trade-off between wages, inflation and unemployment. In this 
situation, uncooperative behaviour on the part of the unions implies that they all try to 
exploit this perceived advantage, leading to overall higher wage demands, higher 
inflation and higher unemployment. 
The logical conclusion from this would be that unions in Europe should, to a certain 
degree, coordinate their wage-setting to prevent such negative externalities from arising. 
If they were to coordinate their demands, no single union could develop false 
expectations or perceptions about the behaviour of the other unions. This has been 
compellingly demonstrated by Tanguy (2000).  
He uses simulation analysis to explore how symmetric and asymmetric shocks affect 
real wages, productivity and unemployment in the four largest EMU member countries. 
Regardless of whether shocks to the European economies are symmetric or asymmetric, 
the coordination of unions’ wage-setting will avoid the situation where negative shocks 
lead to unemployment as high as uncoordinated wage-setting does. The reason for this 
is the internalisation (through coordination) of negative spillovers. DANIEL GROS & CARSTEN HEFEKER 
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At present, however, the prospects for such coordination among European labour unions 
are bleak. As Scheremet (2000) and Guichard and Laffargue (2000) find, wage-setting 
in Germany, Finland, Belgium and Austria is largely productivity-oriented, while this is 
less the case in France, Italy and the Netherlands.3 There is almost no connection (not 
even a negative one) in Portugal, Spain and Greece. One reason for this may be the 
different organisational level of labour unions among the countries. And despite the 
convergence in inflation rates, inflationary expectations still differ. Finally, the elasticity 
of wages with respect to unemployment differs significantly across these countries.  
This evidence strongly suggests that it would be difficult for European labour unions to 
agree on a common process of wage formation. Further, it could take a considerable 
time before attitudes in wage-setting have sufficiently converged. 
Indeed, it is not at all clear that cooperation among labour unions is really desirable, 
because there is a negative side to cooperation too. Borghijs (2000) has argued that the 
coordinated behaviour of unions increases their bargaining power with firms, which 
they may exploit to demand higher wages. Should this effect be stronger than the 
expected positive effect from coordination, attempts to unionise the labour movement 
could have a strongly adverse impact on employment. He argues instead that product 
market integration will increase the competition among labour unions and this will lead 
to more moderate wage-setting. The pro-employment competition effect is then 
neutralised through cooperation.4 
The few years of observations available under the EMU regime do not allow any 
definite judgement. The data presented here (see figures above) suggest that the decline 
of the wage share has stopped, which also suggests that wage moderation has come to 
an end. Yet if one compares the euro area data to that of the UK, one has the opposite 
conclusion: the wage share has gone up much more in the UK, suggesting that wage 
demands have been more moderate in the euro area. 
1.2  Employment  
Basic economic theory suggests that moderate wage-setting behaviour should be 
conducive to a higher level of employment. In the EU, this would mean a reduction in 
the high structural unemployment rate observed during the 1980s and 1990s and an 
increase in labour force participation rates, which are low compared with the US. The 
fact that falling unemployment rates and intense employment growth were possible in 
the last few years without creating excessive inflationary pressure may lead one to the 
conclusion that such an improvement is on its way. But a closer look at recent trends in 
the European labour markets and at the process of labour market reform in several EU 
countries casts some shadows on this optimistic expectation, as a presentation of the 
trends in employment and unemployment rates demonstrates.5  
                                                 
3 Actually, Scheremet’s and Guichard and Laffargue’s results differ for Italy. 
4 Apart from the desirability of the situation, one has to recognise that the influence of labour unions has 
been in a deep decline in recent years (Franz and Steiner, 1999). 
5 This section draws heavily on Gros et al. (2001). ASYMMETRIES IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND 
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Trends in employment and unemployment rates 
If one wants to identify changes in structural unemployment, one has to look at 
developments over a period that comprises a full cycle or at least compare two points in 
time during which the economy was at a similar cyclical position. This is clearly not the 
case if one compares 1995 with 1999 or 2000, because in 1995 the European economy 
had only recovered weakly from the trough of the recession, whereas in 1999-2000, it 
was close to potential output. Thus it seems much more appropriate to compare the 
recent data (1999-2000) with data from a decade ago, i.e. 1990, when Europe was also 
on an upswing – on the back of the positive expectations created by the internal market 
programme. This is the time horizon we will adopt wherever possible. 
Looking at the 1990-1999 period yields a less reassuring picture for Europe. During this 
period, the unemployment rate fell from 5.7% to 4.3% in the US, while in the EU it 
actually increased from 8.4% to 9.3%.6 The employment rate, which is the proportion 
of the working-age population (15 to 64 years) that is employed, improved from 61.6% 
to 62.6%.7 
This comparison of the situation at the beginning of the 1990s and at the end of the 
same decade is the combined result of the worsening of the European labour markets 
during the first half of the 1990s, and the recuperation of employment in the second half 
of the same decade. Whether this evolution is of a cyclical nature or whether, on the 
contrary, the recent employment creation in some EU countries (notably France and 
Spain) is an indication of a structural improvement, is very much debated.  
One way to shed light on this question is to analyse the labour market situation of 
different population groups, since there have been significant changes in the 
composition of labour supply and of labour demand. Table 1 reports both the 
unemployment and the employment rates of men and women for three different age 
groups (16-24, 25-54 and 55-64) in 1990 and 1999. Table 2 gives the same information 
regarding the four largest countries in the euro area (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), 
which jointly represent around 85% of the euro area’s labour force. 
Unemployment rates in the EU increased for almost all age groups (the only exception 
being women, aged 15-24). This is replicated in most of the four largest countries in the 
euro area as shown in Table 2. Unemployment rates increased for all groups in 
Germany, France and Italy, while in Spain they decreased mainly for young workers 
and slightly for men aged 25-54.  
 
                                                 
6 During the year 2000, the unemployment rate reduced significantly in the EU. Nevertheless, it still 
remains slightly above the 1990 level.  
7 The range of variation of employment rates both within EU countries and within regions of certain EU 
countries is even higher than the difference between the EU and the US. We will disregard this variation 
in what follows, but it should be kept in mind that an increase in the employment rate in the EU would 
require either a significant reallocation of employment across the regions or a much higher geographical 
mobility among workers than currently exists. DANIEL GROS & CARSTEN HEFEKER 
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Table 1. Employment and unemployment rates in the EU in the 1990s 
  Unemployment rates  Employment rates 
  1990 1999 1990 1999 
  All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women 
All  8.4 6.7  10.8  9.3 8.2  10.9  61.6  74.7 48.7  62.6  72.0 53.1 
15-24  15.8 13.6  18.3  17.2 16.1  17.0  46.2 50.7  40.6  39.5 43.4  35.5 
25-54 6.8 5.3  9.2  8.1 6.9  9.2  73.4  88.8 55.6  75.5  86.3 64.7 
55-64 6.5 6.2  6.9  7.8 8.4  7.7  38.3  53.1 25.4  38.6  48.3 27.8 
 
Variation 
unemployment rate 
EU, 1990-99 
Variation 
employment rate 
EU, 1990-99 
Differences 
unemployment rate 
US-EU, 1990 
Differences 
unemployment rate 
US-EU, 1999 
All  0.9 1.5  0.1  1.0 -2.7 4.4  -2.7 -1.0  -5.2  -5.0 -4.1  -6.5 
15-24 1.4 2.5  -1.3  -6.7  -7.3  -5.1  -4.6 -2.0  -7.6  -7.3 -5.8  -7.5 
25-54 1.3 1.6  0.0  2.1 -2.5 9.1  -2.2 -0.7  -4.6  -4.9 -3.9  -5.8 
55-64 1.3 2.2  0.8  0.3 -4.8 2.4  -3.2 -2.4  -4.1  -5.1 -5.7  -5.1 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, 2000. 
 
As for employment rates, the most noticeable feature is the increase of female 
employment in both areas: the proportion of working age women who are employed has 
increased by 4.4 percentage points (p.p.) in the EU. This increase is especially driven by 
women in the 25-54 age group, but the countries show some variations. The increase in 
the employment rate of women aged 25-54 is higher in Germany and Spain than in 
France and Italy.  
Table 1 also shows a significant difference with the US. It is obvious that the US has 
been much more successful in creating employment in all categories than Europe. This 
comparison graphically illustrates the rationale behind the EU Council’s pledge in 
Lisbon in March 2000, to regain the conditions for full employment, in which the 
overall employment rate should increase to 70% by 2010 (and to 60% for women). 
This goal cannot be reached by merely reversing the relatively small fall in prime-aged 
male employment rates, because the employment rate for this group remains high, close 
to the US level. The large increase in the overall employment rate set as a goal in 
Lisbon can only be reached if the employment prospects of the groups with low 
employment rates are improved. Employment policies should thus focus on young and 
female workers and also on older workers who are close to retirement. There is general 
agreement that the lower employment rates of young workers and adult women with 
low levels of education are very much related to standard labour market practices, such 
as minimum wages, firing costs and collective bargaining procedures. 
The aggregate differences between the US and the EU are well known. Yet there are 
important differences even within the EU and the eurozone. Table 2 presents the 
relevant data for the three large euro countries Germany, France and Italy. Panel A 
shows the levels of employment and unemployment and Panel B shows the variations. 
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Table 2. Employment and unemployment rates in the four largest euro-area countries in 
the 1990s 
Panel A 
  Germany France 
 1990  1999  1990  1999 
  All Men  Women  All Men  Women  All Men  Women  All Men  Women 
Unemployment rates 
All  6.3 5.4 7.5  8.7 8.3 9.3  9.2 7.0 12.1  11.8  10.3  13.7 
15-24 5.6  5.3  6.0  8.5  9.1  7.7  19.1 15.3 23.9  26.6 24.2 29.7 
25-54  5.7 4.7 7.1  7.9 7.3 8.7  8.0 5.9 10.7  10.7  9.0 12.6 
55-64  11.6  9.9 15.2  13.9  12.8  15.5  6.7 6.0 7.6  8.7 8.7 8.7 
Employment rates 
All  64.1 75.7 52.2  64.9 73.1 56.5  59.9 69.7 50.3  59.8 66.8 52.9 
15-24 56.4 58.7 54.0  46.8 50.7 42.8  29.5 33.6 25.2  20.8 24.3 17.3 
25-54 78.0 86.9 59.6  78.2 87.0 69.2  77.4 89.8 65.1  77.0 85.7 68.5 
55-64 36.8 52.0 22.4  38.5 48.0 28.9  35.6 43.0 28.8  34.2 38.9 29.6 
 
  Italy Spain 
 1990  1999  1990  1999 
  All Men  Women  All Men  Women  All Men  Women  All Men  Women 
Unemployment rates 
All  9.9  6.5  15.8 11.8  9.0  16.4 16.1  11.8  24.4 15.9  11.1  23.2 
15-24 28.9 23.4 35.4  32.9 28.6 38.3  30.1 23.2 39.7  28.5 21.7 37.3 
25-54  6.6 3.9 11.3  9.5 6.9 13.6  13.1  9.3 20.6  13.9  9.2 21.0 
55-64  1.8 1.7 2.0  4.9 4.6 5.6  8.1 8.4 7.2  9.9 9.4 11.2 
Employment rates 
All  53.9 72.0 36.4  52.5 67.1 38.1  51.1 71.0 31.6  53.8 69.6 38.3 
15-24 33.3 38.8 27.8  25.5 30.3 20.8  38.3 47.4 28.7  33.9 41.3 26.2 
25-54 68.0 90.2 46.2  66.9 84.3 49.5  61.1 85.5 37.2  65.6 84.2 47.6 
55-64 32.0 50.9 14.7  27.5 40.8 15.0  36.8 57.2 18.1  34.9 52.4 19.1 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, 2000. 
A closer look at the data reveals that in most respects, Germany and France are very 
similar in terms of the relative structure of employment rates: within the employment 
rates, the overall averages and the relative values for men and women are quite similar. 
The main difference between France and Germany concerns the youngest group (15-24 
years) where the German apprenticeship system leads to a much higher employment 
ratio. 
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Panel B (Table 2 cont.) 
  Variations in the 
unemployment rate, 
Germany, 1990-99 
Variations in the 
employment rate, 
Germany, 1990-99 
Variations in the 
unemployment rate, 
Italy, 1990-99 
Variations in the 
employment rate, 
Italy, 1990-99 
  All   Men   Women  All   Men   Women  All   Men   Women  All   Men   Women 
All  2.0 2.9 1.8  0.8 -2.6  4.3  1.9 2.5 0.6  -1.4  -4.9  1.7 
15-24 3.5  3.8  1.7  -9.6  -8.0  -11.2  4.0  5.2  2.9  -7.8  -8.5  -7.0 
25-54  2.2 2.6 1.6  0.2 0.1 9.6  2.9 3.0 2.3  -1.1  -5.9  3.3 
55-64  2.3 3.1 0.3  1.7 -4.0  6.5  3.1 2.9 3.6  -4.5  -10.1  0.3 
  Variations in the 
unemployment rate, 
France, 1990-99 
Variations in the 
employment rate, 
France, 1990-99 
Variations in the 
unemployment rate, 
Spain, 1990-99 
Variations in the 
employment rate, 
Spain, 1990-99 
All  2.6  3.3  1.6  -0.1 -2.9 2.6  -0.2 -0.7 -1.2  2.7  -1.4 6.7 
15-24 7.5  8.9  6.2  -8.7  -9.3  -7.9  -1.6 -1.5 -2.4  -4.4 -6.1 -2.5 
25-54  2.7  3.1  1.9  -0.4 -4.1 3.4  0.8  -0.1 0.4  4.5  -1.3 10.4 
55-64 0.9  2.7  1.1  -1.4  -4.1  0.8  1.8  1.0  4.0  -1.9  -4.8  1.0 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, 2000. 
The data for Spain and Italy reveal some important differences when compared with 
France and Germany, but there are some similarities among them across different age 
classes. The two ‘Latin’ countries have lower overall employment ratios, which mainly 
result from very low employment ratios for women in the main working age bracket 
(25-54). This key difference seems to have diminished over the period considered, but it 
remains important even in recent data. 
The analysis of the labour market situation by age and gender thus already yields some 
insights as to where to aim labour market policies. There is another aspect that is even 
more relevant in the discussion of the relationship between labour markets and the ‘new 
economy’. This is the relative supply of skilled and unskilled workers, since the new 
economy should increase both the rate of technological progress and the bias in favour 
of skilled labour.8  
Table 3 reports the composition of the population and employment rates by age, gender 
and educational attainments in the four largest euro-area countries (Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain) as of 1999. The proportion of population with university degrees is 
increasing fast, as new cohorts in some countries of southern Europe are entering 
universities at a higher rate.  
Thus, there are large differences in the employment rate among the population groups 
considered above. Moreover, there have been large changes in the supply of different 
educational groups. This suggests that one should analyse the changes in the 
composition of employment by gender and educational attainment in some detail, as we 
proceed to do below in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
                                                 
8
 This has been an extensively researched topic in labour economics. See, for instance, Bound and 
Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Nickell and Bell (1995) and Snower (1999). ASYMMETRIES IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND 
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Table 3. Labour supply and employment rates by age, gender and educational 
attainments: the four largest euro-area countries, 1999 
Population weights (%)  Employment rates (%)  Age/ educational 
attainment  Men   Women  Men  Women 
16-24   9.9  9.9  39.2  31.1 
Secondary level  4.0  4.3  44.5  37.3 
Primary level   5.9  5.6  33.4  21.1 
25-54  31.5  31.0 86.0 63.1 
Tertiary level  5.9  4.4  91.4  79.3 
Secondary  level  11.7  11.0 86.9 68.6 
Primary level   13.9  15.6  80.4  44.9 
55-64 8.3  8.5  44.4  24.6 
Tertiary level  1.1  0.4  62.4  46.3 
Secondary level  2.3  1.8  42.6  29.6 
Primary level   4.9  6.3  37.5  17.9 
TOTAL  49.7  50.4 71.2 51.1 
Notes: Tertiary level of education: ISCED 5-7. Secondary level of education: ISCED 3-4. Primary level of education: 
ISCED 1-2.  
Sources: European Labour Force Survey (1999) and Current Population Survey (March Supplement, 1999). 
 
Tables 4 and 5 break down the aggregate employment rate into two components: 
1)  Changes in the composition of the population, i.e.  the result of differences in 
population weights, holding employment rates equal at the 1992 levels (the last 
row), and  
2)  Changes in group-specific employment rates, i.e. the results from differences in 
employment rates, holding population weights at the 1999 level (the most important 
elements are shown from the second to the last row).9  
Because of data availability, the base year this time is 1992 instead of 1990 (however, 
this should not affect the conclusions). 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The decomposition is given by the following expression: 
1999 1992 1999 1999 1992 1992 1992 1999 1999 1999 1999 1992 () ( ) ii ii i i i i i i
iii i
ee e e e e e αα α α α −= − = − + − ∑∑∑ ∑  where e
t is the 
employment rate at year t, αi is the weight of group i in total population and groups are defined by age 
(15-24, 25-54, 55-64), gender and education (tertiary, secondary and primary). DANIEL GROS & CARSTEN HEFEKER 
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Table 4. Changes in employment rates and the composition of the population in the US, 
UK and the euro-4, 1992-1999 (p.p.)  
  UK
* Euro-4  Germany  France   Italy  Spain 
 Change in the employment rate   +3.4  +2.3  -1.2  +0.3  +4.0  +6.2 
Variation due to the change in the 
employment rates of highly educated 
workers 
0.50 -0.3  0.22  0.6  -0.14  -0.67 
Variation due to the change in the 
employment rates of workers with 
secondary education 
1.31 -0.2  0.32  0.1  -1.11  0.43 
Variation due to the change in the 
employment rates of workers with 
primary education 
-1.36 -0.9  -0.75  -3.1  -1.47  2.22 
Variation due to the change in the 
employment rates of women with a 
high degree of education 
0.27 -0.1  0.36  -0.3  -0.04  -0.31 
Variation due to the change in the 
employment rates of women with 
secondary education 
0.34 0.4  1.22  0.2  -0.31  0.29 
Variation due to the change in the 
employment rates of women with 
primary education 
-0.84 -0.1  -0.23  -1.2  -0.35  1.35 
Variation due to the change in the 
composition of the population 
2.97 3.8  -0.95  3.8  6.76  4.21 
* For the UK, the variation is over the period of 1993-1999. 
Sources: European Labour Force Survey and Current Population Survey. 
The first two entries in the first row of Table 4 show that over this period the overall 
change in the employment ratio was broadly similar in the UK and the euro-4 group. 
But there are considerable differences in the origins of this common development. The 
change in the aggregate employment rate in EU countries is mostly driven by the 
population composition effect. This is particularly the case for the euro-4 group, where 
the entry in the last row (the effect of change in the composition of population, 3.8 p.p.) 
is actually larger than that of the first row (the overall increase in employment, 2.3 p.p.). 
This implies that if the employment rates of all the groups considered here had merely 
stayed constant, the employment rate in the euro-4 group would have increased by 3.8 
p.p., instead of the 2.3 p.p. actually observed. The actual outcome was lower because 
employment rates fell in some important subgroups, such as workers with less than 
tertiary education. The picture for the UK is a bit different, but nevertheless closer to 
that of the euro-4 than to the US (see Gros et al., 2001).  
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Table 5. Changes in employment rates and in the composition of the population in 
selected EU countries, 1992-99 (p.p.) 
  Belgium Netherlands Portugal Austria* Sweden* Finland* Denmark
Change in the employment rate  +2.4  +7.7  -0.6 -0.2 -3.0 +11.3  +3.1 
Variation due to the change in 
the employment rates of highly 
educated workers 
0.25 1.31  -0.07  0.05 -1.46  1.05 -0.50 
Variation due to the change in 
the employment rates of workers 
with secondary education 
0.18 4.59  0.07 0.10 -1.74  4.05 1.42 
Variation due to the change in 
the employment rates of workers 
with primary education 
-0.73 2.71  0.34  -0.85 -0.40 1.37  0.01 
Variation due to the change in 
the employment rates of women 
with a high degree of education 
0.28 1.05  -0.06  0.00 -0.76  0.42 -0.45 
Variation due to the change in 
the employment rates of women 
with secondary education 
0.39 3.73  0.16 0.73 -1.18  1.71 0.29 
Variation due to the change in 
the employment rates of women 
with primary education 
0.39 1.40  1.55 -0.46  -0.26  0.48 -0.16 
Variation due to the change in 
the composition of the 
population 
2.70  -0.96  -0.95 -0.44 0.61  4.83  2.13 
* For Austria, Sweden and Finland, the variation is over the period of 1995-99. 
Sources: European Labour Force Survey and Current Population Survey. 
Summing up, overall employment in Europe increased because an increasing number of 
people have a higher level of education and thus work in occupations for which the 
barriers to employment that result from collective wage agreements, working hours and 
firing rules are less important. 
The analysis presented so far has one encouraging implication: the effects from the 
changes in the composition of the population are bound to continue as a result of the 
continuing changes in the age composition of the population and of the continuation of 
the educational upgrading of the labour force. Hence, even under unchanged group-
specific employment rates, the aggregate employment rate ought to increase.10  
So far, we have shown that there are huge differences across the four largest countries, 
within each one of them (which becomes obvious if one disaggregates the national 
figures) and also in their relative position in comparison to the US. To obtain a 
                                                 
10 For estimations and projections of this, see Gros et al. (2001). DANIEL GROS & CARSTEN HEFEKER 
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somewhat broader picture of the European labour market as a whole, however, it may 
be useful to look at the rates of employment/unemployment and their variation for all 
European countries over time.  
This view also serves as a summary measure of whether European labour markets have 
converged in terms of employment/unemployment over the last decades. We have 
calculated the correlation between single countries and the EU-15 average over the 
1980s and 1990s. We have done this for the levels of employment and unemployment 
(Figures 7 and 9) and for the changes in employment and unemployment as well 
(Figures 8 and 10). Finally, we have calculated the correlation for the growth of 
employment in Europe (Figure 11).14 This glosses over many of the finer details that we 
presented in the former section, but may serve as a useful indicator of what monetary 
policy is likely to look at as a basis for its decision. 
The evidence, at best, is unclear. There is no valid general conclusion to characterise all 
countries on all of the considered dimensions. Some countries have become closer to the 
European average and others more detached from it in comparison to the 1980s. Italy 
and Finland, for example, have clearly converged towards the European average (on all 
dimensions) whereas Greece, Ireland and the UK have moved away from the average. 
Except for employment levels, the correlation for Western Germany has fallen during 
this period, whereas for France it has increased (except in growth of employment). 
Figure 7. Correlation of unemployment rates with EU-15 average (levels) 
 
                                                 
14 Data for united Germany (DEU) are available only for the 1990s. The comparison is only possible for 
Western Germany (DEW). 
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Figure 8. Correlation of unemployment rates with EU-15 average (changes) 
 
 
Figure 9. Correlation of employment rates with EU-15 average (levels) 
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Figure 10. Correlation of employment rates with EU-15 average (changes) 
Figure 11. Correlation of employment growth with EU-15 average (persons) 
As found in the evidence on wages, there is some convergence for some countries on all 
accounts, for some on some accounts and there are clearly countries that have moved 
away from the average. What this demonstrates is that for Europe as a whole, one 
cannot really detect a strong convergence of employment or unemployment, despite the 
existence of some convergence in wage-setting.  
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2.  How to deal with asymmetries in European labour markets? 
The limited convergence is not much cause for concern if one were to conclude that 
labour markets have been increasingly liberalised and therefore, the adjustment 
potential of labour markets in European countries is high enough to be able to account 
for asymmetric developments. If that was the case, a common monetary policy should 
pose no problems, despite the asymmetries.  
The standard approach to this question can be found in literature on the so-called 
‘Optimum Currency Area’ (OCA) (for surveys, see Eichengreen and Bayoumi, 1996 or 
Gros and Thygesen, 1998). There, countries are grouped according to the symmetry of 
shocks that hit them and to the potential alternative adjustment mechanism (apart from 
monetary policy) that they have to address these shocks. In that approach, a common 
monetary policy poses no problem if there are only symmetric shocks.11  
Quite a large amount of literature has been devoted to this subject, trying to find out 
how far European countries are hit by asymmetric shocks. We will not enter into that 
discussion here because there are already a significant number of surveys on this 
subject. The upshot of these studies is that there are basically two circles in Europe, an 
inner core of countries, comprising Germany and its immediate neighbours that form 
the Optimum Currency Area, and the periphery that is characterised by asymmetric 
shocks. 
That would suggest that a common monetary policy would only be appropriate for the 
inner core of the EMU members.12 But the theory of Optimum Currency Areas builds 
on two dubious assumptions. The first is the assumption of inflexible labour markets 
with fixed nominal-wages, but flexible real-wages. Flexible nominal-wages on the one 
hand or inflexible real-wages on the other hand are both incompatible with that theory.13 
Therefore, the theory is basically irrelevant if labour markets are flexible. This in turn 
leads to the interesting question of what is the degree of labour market flexibility within 
European labour markets. The second assumption, which is the focus of the next 
chapter, is that monetary policy works symmetrically in member states. 
The discussion above suggests that in the past labour markets have not been sufficiently 
flexible to ensure full employment. But that may be changing now. Before we examine 
the degree of liberalisation and flexibilisation of European labour markets, we briefly 
look at alternative adjustment mechanisms that are compatible with a common 
monetary policy. From the OCA theory, labour mobility and fiscal integration 
immediately spring to mind as such alternative mechanisms. If these are sufficiently 
powerful, no further problems should arise. 
                                                 
11
 We will argue below that this approach neglects the important influence of the asymmetric effects of a 
common monetary policy. 
12 Notice that this is essentially a static theory that does not take into account that industry structure and 
thus the incidence of shocks could adjust to the introduction of a monetary union (Frankel and Rose, 
1996). 
13 Evidence on the degree of real-wage rigidity in European countries is presented by Layard et al. (1991) 
and Vinals and Jimeno (1997). DANIEL GROS & CARSTEN HEFEKER 
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2.1  Labour mobility 
Most of the literature on labour mobility has taken the US as a natural comparison, 
concluding that labour in the US is much more mobile than in Europe (Obstfeld and 
Peri, 1998). This conclusion would suggest that Europe is obviously not an Optimum 
Currency Area. Blanchard and Katz (1992), for instance, have shown that in reaction to 
regional shocks, US workers tend to move from one region to another. Using the same 
methodology, Decressin and Fatas (1995) have shown that in Europe, instead of 
migration, the participation rate varies. If regions are hit by negative shocks and 
unemployment increases, some people simply drop out of the labour market, which 
shows up as at least some adjustment in the official unemployment rates. Nahuis and 
Parikh (2000) support this finding and report that female participation reacts with 
especial strength to unemployment. Migration is not an adjustment mechanism as it 
does not react in any significant amount to variations in GDP or to variations in 
unemployment. An increase of 1% in GDP leads to a 0.005% reaction in migration; for 
unemployment the response is even lower (0.00095%). 
The negative conclusion this implies for the prospects of the EMU has to be qualified a 
bit, however, if one takes into account that the labour movement response within 
countries is not higher than that across borders. In that sense, most countries do not 
themselves constitute Optimum Currency Areas either (see the survey by Gros and 
Hefeker, 1999). 
2.2  Fiscal policy and buffer funds 
The major difference between nation states and the EMU, of course, is the different 
degree of fiscal centralisation. Another argument put forward in the OCA theory is the 
need for fiscal integration if countries surrender their independent monetary policy (see 
Ingram, 1959 and Kenen, 1969). Given that the EU budget is so limited, it is hardly 
conceivable that there would be a wide-ranging redistribution across European 
countries. And the current situation clearly rules out any further increases in the 
European budget. With the enlargement to begin very soon, member states have made it 
clear that they are not willing to expand the current system of regional support. This 
could leave the member states alone to find mechanisms able to account for large, 
negative, exogenous shocks once monetary policy is lost. 
One such innovative concept is the Finnish EMU buffer fund. Alho (2000) describes the 
Finnish idea of setting up an emergency fund that could be stuffed in good times and 
allow the country to draw upon it when negative shocks occur. He finds, however, that 
one problem of this fund is that it would hardly be big enough to account for big shocks. 
And maybe even more problematic is the involved, moral hazard problem, wherein 
people would be invited to trust in such a fund instead of making all possible efforts to 
adjust to shocks themselves. The fund would be subject to a standard time consistency 
problem, because the promises of any government not to use the fund, (and allow 
maximum private efforts to deal with shocks) would just not be credible. 
2.3  Increasing labour market flexibility 
Because labour mobility and fiscal redistribution in Europe are too low, labour market 
flexibilisation is needed. Although the OCA took the structure of labour markets as 
given and looked for alternative adjustment mechanisms, the dismal conclusions from ASYMMETRIES IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND 
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that evidence could be discarded if the markets became more flexible. Therefore, 
adjustment would come from within the labour markets and alternative mechanisms to 
adjust to shocks would no longer be necessary. 
Thus, it is interesting to see how far European economies have come in liberalising 
labour markets. In the next section, we review some recent developments in the 
attempts to liberalise European labour markets. If these attempts were found to be 
successful to a large extent, one might be confident that the situation in labour markets 
would improve and that any existing asymmetries would pose no problem for monetary 
policy. In that case, labour markets would be able to adjust to all kinds of shocks and to 
every monetary policy. Unfortunately, we show that European labour markets in general 
are quite a distance away from being flexible enough. And there is no reason to expect 
that this should change in the foreseeable future, as suggested by the theoretical 
literature.  
Labour market reforms so far 
Labour market reforms have been under discussion for the last 20 years, during which 
time the different EU countries have undertaken extensive reforms of their labour 
markets.14 But Bertola et al. (2000) conclude that labour market reforms have been 
‘marginal’ and in some cases, ‘contradictory’, and that there are substantial differences 
in the approach to labour market and product market regulation across EU countries. 
Hence, if this assessment is true, the reductions of unemployment rates in recent years 
would be only a transitory phenomenon. 
An important milestone in the process of labour market reform in the EU is the 
coordination of the employment policies agreed at the Luxembourg European Council 
of November 1997. Under the so-called ‘Luxembourg process’, countries are required 
to elaborate an annual National Action Plan (NAP) under guidelines that should be the 
basis for employment policies in the EU, according to the Council. These policies put 
emphasis on the ‘employability’, ‘entrepreneurship’, ‘adaptability’ and ‘equal 
opportunities’ of the labour force. NAPs should spell out employment and regulation 
policies that meet these guidelines, and submit them for evaluation by the European 
Commission. The grant of Cohesion Funds was recently made conditional on having 
received a positive evaluation. 
At first sight, the approach embedded in the Luxembourg process to fight structural 
unemployment seems sound. But the diagnosis of the problem is inadequate, as it does 
not identify the still-pervasive protection of insiders in the labour market. In practice, 
the results so far have been disappointing. First, the only quantitative targets for   
employment policies refer to the proportion of unemployed, i.e. those already covered 
by active labour market policies (Guideline 1 regarding ‘employability’), whose 
effectiveness in reducing unemployment is not always rigorously assessed. Secondly, 
the supervision of NAPs by the Commission is not effective. Thus, while some 
countries take the process seriously and perform a thorough analysis of their 
employment policies and try to find new measures to improve the functioning of the 
                                                 
14 This section is based on Gros et al. (2001). DANIEL GROS & CARSTEN HEFEKER 
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labour market, others introduce only marginal reforms and keep the ineffective 
measures of the past. Admittedly, it may still be too early to judge a long-term process 
that is being updated from time to time. In particular, the introduction of the quantitative 
targets for employment rates agreed by the European Council (in Lisbon, 2000 and in 
Stockholm, 2001) may introduce some peer pressure on those countries that have less 
employment-friendly policies. The problem with this approach, however, is that there 
will be a considerable time lag between the enactment of reforms and the payoff in 
terms of higher employment. Governments are thus constantly tempted to adopt the 
measures that promise the quickest results, even if these are only transitory. Instead of a 
full-fledged analysis, we look below at the development of ‘atypical’ labour contracts 
that allow more flexibility than standard contracts.  
There seems to have been a permanent change in the labour market over the last decade, 
derived from the liberalisation of atypical employment contracts, such as part-time 
contracts in the Netherlands and fixed-term employment contracts (first in Spain and 
more recently in France and Italy).15 Among the myriad of labour market reforms 
introduced in EU countries over the last two decades, the most consistent line of reform 
is the liberalisation of atypical employment contracts in an attempt to reduce 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) for new entrants in the labour market.  
The impact of this partial liberalisation can be seen in the numbers. Since 1985, for 
instance, the proportion of employees under temporary contracts increased in almost all 
EU countries, with the exception of Greece (see Table 6). 
There are wide differences in the importance of temporary contracts just among the 
euro-4, ranging from close to a third in Spain to less than 10% in Italy. But the overall 
trend is unmistakable: temporary contracts are no longer just a marginal phenomenon. 
Their growth has actually accounted for a large part of all employment creation. Figure 
12 reports the decomposition of employment growth by contract duration (permanent or 
temporary) in the EU over the 1990-1998 period, showing that the rate of growth of 
temporary employment in recent years was almost nine times that of the rate of growth 
of permanent employment, with temporary contracts providing one-half of all 
employment creation. During the recession of the early 1990s, temporary contracts 
actually continued to grow, whereas permanent employment declined.  
But should one expect a lasting reduction in unemployment from more temporary 
contracts? Recent theoretical work suggests that in principle, a dualisation of the labour 
market produced by this type of measure has ambiguous effects on unemployment (see 
Dolado et al., 2001, and Blanchard and Landier, 2001), as temporary employment 
increases both the flows from unemployment to employment and the flows from 
employment to unemployment.  
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Table 6. Temporary employment in selected EU countries 
     % Temporary employees  Variation 
 1985  1990  1996  1998  1985-98 
Spain  15.6 29.8 33.6  32.9  17.3 
Men 14.4  27.8  31.9  32.1  17.7 
Women 18.4  34.2  36.7  34.4  16.0 
Finland  10.5 11.5 17.3  17.7  7.2 
Men 9.6    14.1  13.3  3.7 
Women 11.3    20.5  21.9  10.6 
Portugal  14.4 18.3 10.6  17.3  2.9 
Men 13.5  16.8  10.2  16.2  2.7 
Women 15.9  20.5  11.1  18.6  2.7 
France  4.7 10.5  12.6  13.9  9.2 
Men 4.8  9.4  11.5  13.0  8.2 
Women 4.6 12.0  13.9  15.0  10.4 
Greece  21.1 16.5 11.0  13.0  -8.0 
Men 21.8  16.9  10.5  12.0  -9.8 
Women 19.6  15.0  11.9  14.7  -4.9 
Germany  10.0 10.5 11.1  12.3  2.3 
Men 9.2  9.8  11.0  12.1  2.9 
Women 11.1  11.6  11.2  12.5  1.4 
Netherlands  7.5 7.6 12.0  12.7  5.2 
Men 5.9  6.1  9.1  10.2  4.3 
Women 10.8  10.2  15.9  16.1  5.3 
Italy  4.8 5.2 7.5  8.6  3.8 
Men 3.6  3.9  6.6  7.5  3.9 
Women 7.0 7.6 8.9 10.3  3.3 
UK  7.0 5.2 7.1  7.1  0.1 
Men 5.7  3.7  6.0  6.0  0.3 
Women 8.8 7.0 8.2 8.3  -0.5 
Source: European Commission (2000).   
Figure 12. Employment growth in the EU by type of employment contract 
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The effects of temporary employment on labour productivity are also controversial: on 
the one hand, temporary jobs may be ‘stepping stones’ into the labour market that 
enhance the professional careers of some workers (see Booth et al., 2001); on the other 
hand, as the employment spell shortens, there are less incentives for investment in firm-
specific human capital, on both the side of employers and the side of the workers. As for 
wages, workers under temporary contracts earn about 10% less than workers of similar 
characteristics under permanent employment contracts. Temporary employment may 
also create a buffer leading to higher wage pressure by workers under permanent 
contracts, insofar as the insiders in wage-setting are permanent employees (see Bentolila 
and Dolado, 1994, for evidence on Spain, and Blanchard and Landier, 2001, for 
evidence on France). 
In addition, such temporary contracts create a division in the labour markets. Labour 
markets not only feature a division between insiders and outsiders (i.e. those who have a 
job and those who do not have one) but also reveal an additional division among regular 
and temporary employees. From political and economic perspectives, such divisions 
may lead to political and social conflicts (see Saint-Paul, 2001). 
As for the recent trend towards the reduction in labour taxation, by means of income tax 
reform or by overall or targeted reductions in social security contributions, there are also 
doubts about the implications for structural unemployment. Theoretically, in a standard 
wage-bargaining model, labour taxation only affects real-wages in the long term, so that 
the reduction of non-wage labour costs translates into higher wages. Nevertheless, if 
minimum wages are binding, the reduction in labour taxation may enhance long-term 
employment and thus generate a decrease in structural unemployment. Empirical 
evidence on this matter is not totally conclusive. On the one hand, Nickell and Layard 
(1999), using panel data for OECD countries, find short-term effects of labour taxation 
on unemployment but only minor effects in the long term, while long-term GDP growth 
does not seem to be affected at all. By contrast, Daveri and Tabellini (2000), using a 
longer time series, find that the average increase of 14 p.p. in labour taxation in EU 
countries over the 1965-1995 period explains a rise of the unemployment rate by 4 p.p. 
and a reduction of GDP growth by 0.4 p.p. per annum.  
All in all, this suggests that the improvement in European labour markets that has taken 
place over the last few years has been largely cyclical in nature. If one takes a longer 
time horizon (e.g. comparing 1990 to 1999), little fundamental improvement is 
apparent. The small improvement that one can observe over this longer period seems to 
be driven essentially by changes in the structure of the European economy, in the sense 
that the sectors for which one would expect labour market regulations to be the most 
binding and where collective wage agreements are the most relevant, e.g. industry, are 
in a secular decline. This seems to lead to wage moderation, which is more apparent 
than real in the sense that in many sectors the wage-share actually increases.  
The same general trend has also led to an increase in employment rates as the level of 
education has increased and people with more education typically have higher 
employment rates. Most employment legislation is designed to protect the typical 
factory worker, not a professional with a university degree. As the importance of the 
latter is increasing all the time, labour market liberalisation is thus occurring by stealth. 
This process is slow; furthermore, additional improvements will be limited, as it is not 
possible for the entire population to acquire a university degree or to work outside ASYMMETRIES IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND 
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factories. Liberalising atypical contracts might have also had an effect at the margin, but 
a dual labour market is unlikely to deliver superior results in the long term. 
The few attempts at structural reform that have been made have often been 
simultaneously accompanied by compensations for some groups in the economy. For 
instance, Bertola and Boeri (2001) report that reforms which reduce the generosity of 
social welfare payments are often bundled together with compensation for some groups, 
and that some measures that are introduced in one year are taken back the next year. 
This only increases the institutional complexity of social welfare in Europe.  
The fact that there has been little structural reform does matter. It not only hampers the 
return to full employment, but there is also little dispute now that excessive regulation – 
whether on goods or labour markets – hampers growth. The stark difference between 
the US and the EU as documented in the previous sections of this paper suggests, 
however, a slightly different question: can excessive regulation also be seen as the 
reason why most EU countries have not experienced the acceleration of productivity 
growth that has taken place in the US? One should expect that the administrative 
barriers to change would become even more important as the speed of technological 
change increases. This is indeed what seems to have happened. Figure 13 shows the 
relationship between administrative regulation and the acceleration of growth during the 
1990s (compared with the 1980s). There is a clear negative association between the 
index of administrative burden used here and the acceleration in growth.16 
The reason for the relationship between the restrictiveness of the administrative burden 
and the acceleration of growth is clear: at a time of rapid technological change it 
becomes even more important for enterprises to be free to reorganise themselves for the 
introduction of productivity-enhancing innovation.  
 
                                                 
16 The UK seems to represent a special case, with a combination of the lowest administrative burden and 
the largest deceleration. The explanation may simply be that the UK introduced its reforms much earlier, 
so that the productivity boom came earlier and the deceleration during the second half of the 1990s 
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Figure 13. EU average unemployment rate and wage inflation (annual changes) in the 
EU-11, 1992-2000 
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Note: AR is a summary indicator of administrative regulation (see Nicoletti et al., 1999). 
Will incentives to liberalise European labour markets increase?  
So far, the evidence shows that there has not been much liberalisation that could affect 
the structural problems in European labour markets. Nevertheless, this need not be the 
case in the future. Once agents realise that the adjustment-valve monetary policy is lost 
for good at the national level, they may accordingly change their behaviour towards 
more flexibility. As shown, this has not happened so far, but what should be anticipated 
in the coming years? 
Unfortunately, theoretical work suggests that much more reform will not be 
forthcoming. Calmfors (1998) and Sibert and Sutherland (2000) have argued that the 
incentives to deregulate may even be lowered with the advent of a monetary union. If 
governments could either use monetary policy or a deregulation of the labour market as 
instruments to fight unemployment (at least temporarily) they would optimally choose 
some combination of both if they are adverse to both inflation and, for political reasons, 
to deregulation. With the introduction of the common currency and the transfer of 
monetary responsibility to the ECB, it is clear that national unemployment will not 
provoke an inflationary response as strong as it would do in the national case alone. In 
other words, the introduction of the euro will automatically lower the connection 
between national unemployment and inflation. A deregulation-adverse government 
could thus reduce structural reforms without having to fear an increase in inflation. If ASYMMETRIES IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND 
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this has a chance of winning votes, governments are thus tempted to actually roll back 
reforms under a monetary union.17 
A similar result is derived by Hughes-Hallett and Viegi (2000), who analyse an 
asymmetric monetary union in the sense that there are some countries with flexible 
labour markets and some with more tightly regulated ones. In the monetary union, more 
adjustment pressure is put on the flexible countries than on the other ones, because it is 
easier for them to adjust. This pressure, of course, makes a monetary union less 
attractive for those with liberal labour markets. These results may be one explanation as 
to why the UK has decided to stay out of the union. In any case, the logic of this 
argument suggests that there are fewer incentives to liberalise once a country is a 
member of the monetary union. 
This logic also has implications for the enlargement of the EMU. If one assumes that the 
inflationary pressures in the candidate countries are higher than in the current member 
states, because of a higher employment aim or because of fiscal problems, this should 
induce them to be relatively aggressive in terms of deregulation, in order to take some 
inflationary pressure off their central banks.18 Those countries with lower distortions 
also have fewer incentives to deregulate their labour markets. Upon enlargement, 
however, this situation will change. The new central bank (at least for the new 
members) will take labour market problems less into account, so that the danger of an 
inflationary response is lowered. Consequently, the incentives to deregulate fall. But 
this is different for those countries where such distortions and inflationary pressures 
have been low. They will be confronted with a monetary policy that reacts, even if only 
a little, to the higher distortions in the new members. This implies a higher danger of 
inflation. To counter this, they have an incentive to deregulate their labour markets in 
order to neutralise the higher inflationary pressure (Hefeker, 2002a).  
Thus, the conclusion is that the older members will actually be induced to deregulate 
their labour markets more upon the arrival of the larger monetary union than they did 
before. Nevertheless, for the candidate countries, the prospects are not so beneficial. 
3.  European monetary policy with asymmetric labour markets 
Monetary policy works asymmetrically 
One aspect that the Optimum Currency Area theory has overlooked is that even if 
shocks are symmetric, monetary union need not be unproblematic. The reason is that the 
response of national economies to monetary policy may differ, given that labour 
markets are differently structured and that they adjust differently to changes in monetary 
policy. For instance, wage indexation in a country implies that increases in the rate of 
inflation have a different effect on real wages than if a country has nominal fixed-wages 
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 Analysing the incentives for labour unions, Hefeker (2001) shows that their incentive to allow reforms 
is not affected by a change in the monetary regime. This conclusion would thus be more optimistic than 
that which focuses on government behaviour. 
18
 This truth is underlined by their desire to join the EMU. Once inside the EMU, however, this incentive 
will be reduced (see Beetsma and Jensen, 2002). DANIEL GROS & CARSTEN HEFEKER 
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that are not indexed. Accordingly, even if both countries are subject to the same shock, 
the need for and the ability of monetary policy will be different. In other words, a 
common monetary policy can work asymmetrically even if it responds to the same 
event. 
The presumption and general result that even symmetric shocks can have asymmetric 
effects is supported by the findings of Barrell and Dury (2000). They are able to clearly 
distinguish a core group of countries (Austria, Germany, Belgium, Finland and the 
Netherlands) that show a faster adjustment in labour markets to the steady state than the 
other group (France, Spain, Portugal and Italy). Thus, even if the member countries are 
hit by the same external shock, say an oil-price increase, some of them need a more 
active monetary policy than others. This again documents that asymmetric shocks are 
not necessarily the main problem of the EMU, in as much as the asymmetric responses 
in the labour markets. 
Barrell and Dury (2000) also show that inflation expectations are formed quite 
differently among the core and the periphery countries. Although the former group (the 
old DM bloc plus Finland) shows no inflationary expectations, this is different in the so-
called ‘Club Med’ countries. This difference leads to another problem of monetary 
policy, wherein the common monetary policy will work differently in the two groups, 
because they react differently to changes in the monetary environment. Pentecost and 
Sessions (2000) support this idea by presenting evidence that the sacrifice ratio is 
different among EMU members.  
Another important aspect is the evidence presented by Mayes and Viren (2000). Testing 
Phillips-curves and Okun-curves for European countries, they show that monetary 
policy does not work symmetrically. For instance, a negative output gap puts little 
downward pressure on the rate of inflation, while a positive output gap has a significant 
impact on inflation.19 A symmetric monetary policy is thus likely to have a tendency to 
be overly inflationary. This tendency, like the asymmetric transmission presented 
above, would be an argument for the ECB to pursue a careful and less active monetary 
policy. 
Inflation rates differ 
The final nail in the coffin for the assumption that the EMU is a homogenous area is 
provided by the evidence that even a common monetary policy has not been able to 
produce a common rate of inflation, as Figure 14 shows. The figure plots inflation rates 
versus the rate of unemployment because these two are usually assumed to be the focus 
of the central bank. 
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 The Okun-curves are also asymmetric in that unemployment takes more time to fall than it takes to rise. ASYMMETRIES IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND 
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Figure 14. CPI-Inflation and unemployment for the EU-12 (2000). 
 
Although it is clear that unemployment rates vary, it may be a bit more mysterious how 
a common monetary policy can lead to different outcomes in terms of price increases. 
Given the main theme of this paper, it is not surprising that asymmetries in the 
economies, and in particular in the labour markets, are again behind this evidence. 
One reason why the composite rate of inflation among countries may differ is the so-
called ‘Balassa-Samuelson’ effect. It is based on the difference between price increases 
in the tradables and non-tradables sectors in an economy. If productivity in the tradables 
sector is increasing faster than in the non-tradables sector, which is typically the case in 
fast-growing economies because the non-tradables sector often comprises labour-
intensive activities, prices in the tradables sector will be lower. In addition, higher 
productivity implies higher wages. If these higher wages, because of competition for 
labour, spill over into the non-tradables sector, production costs and prices there will 
increase faster than in the tradables sector. The strength of this effect obviously depends 
on the degree of competition in the labour market.  
The problem will be less severe if labour markets are decentralised and wages can 
differ, depending on whether they are paid in the tradables or non-tradables sector. If 
labour unions are very powerful, however, it is likely that the degree of wage 
convergence between the two sectors is higher than competition would allow. 
But differences in the rate of inflation among countries can also be because of different 
growth processes, which lead to different relative prices in the economies. The prices of 
tradable goods are more or less tied together because of international competition, but 
prices in the non-tradables sectors can diverge. Similar effects on relative prices in 
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member states can follow from different degrees of regulation or different degrees of 
competition in the non-tradables sector. Unofficial trade barriers and regulation may 
also drive the prices for tradable goods apart from those in other member states. Thus, 
not only does the degree of labour market competition and regulation play a role but 
competition and regulation also play a role more generally. 
This non-exhaustive list of reasons of why inflation rates differ – even with the same 
monetary policy – poses another challenge to the design and implementation of 
monetary policy in Euroland, because these also imply that the monetary policy will 
have quite a different impact on employment and output in the different member states. 
Again, the importance of such differences is likely to increase the moment at which the 
EMU is enlarged. Given the different structures that remain in the candidate economies, 
the common monetary area will become an even less homogeneous area than it is today. 
Differences in the transmission of monetary policy  
How important are differences in the transmission mechanism? The literature on this 
point is difficult to interpret. Some maintain that the differences in the transmission 
mechanism are so large that these will make the operation of the EMU difficult 
(Cecchetti, 1999). Others argue that these differences are due to differences in financial 
structures, which will diminish over time as countries share a common monetary policy 
(Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi, 1998). Most empirical studies concur, however, that 
at present there are still large differences in the transmission mechanism, although they 
are difficult to estimate precisely (see e.g. Borio, 1995, Gerlach and Smets, 1995, 
Eijffinger and de Haan, 2000, and Toolsema, Sturm and de Haan, 2001).20 
Table 7. Transmission of monetary policy 
Country  Impact on output of a 1% increase in 
interest rates (absolute changes) 
EMU members   
Belgium 0.72 
France 1.30 
Germany 1.21 
Ireland 0.76 
Italy   0.64 
Portugal 0.39 
Spain 0.46 
  
EMU non-members   
Denmark 0.48 
Sweden 0.56 
United Kingdom  0.53 
  
Source: Cecchetti, 1999. 
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 See, however, Clausen and Hayo (2002) who argue that transmission might be relatively similar among 
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Table 7 reports the estimates from Cecchetti (1999), which suggest that the differences 
in the output multiplier are considerable. The highest coefficient is over three times 
larger than the lowest. There is thus some evidence that differences in the transmission 
mechanisms are large. These findings are compounded by Mayes and Viren (2000), 
who show that transmission is also different across sectors in a given country.  
Bringing this together with the remaining large divergence in European rates of 
unemployment, the following Figure 15 shows a severe problem for the ECB. 
 
Figure 15. Unemployment and transmission 
What should the ECB do? 
How should the ECB react to the significant differences in unemployment and in 
inflation? Should it react at all to these divergences? The standard answer is no, since 
the ECB is held responsible only for the average performance of the entire eurozone. 
Nevertheless, as the performance in some countries starts to diverge considerably from 
the average, this answer is not satisfactory. It is not satisfactory because it does not take 
into account that the EU was created to serve the interests of its member states, which 
remain the basic political units in Europe. This distinguishes the euro area from nation 
states, even very federally organised ones, in which the main political unit coincides 
with the monetary union. Countries whose performance diverges a lot from the average 
are not served appropriately by a ‘one-size-fits–all’ policy if the welfare loss is a 
quadratic function of the output gap and inflation. The average welfare loss of member 
states increases as the standard deviations of output and inflation increase.  
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But in a monetary union it is impossible to have a nationally differentiated monetary 
policy. One is tempted to conclude that although the ECB may bemoan national 
divergences within the euro area, there is nothing it could or should do about them. This 
conclusion is, however, rash if one admits that monetary policy involves (at least in the 
short term), a trade off between inflation and output. Referring to the current problems, 
the question arises as to whether the inflation rate of, for example, Ireland, should be 
considered just one element in the calculation of the average area-wide inflation rate or 
whether one should consider the high welfare losses it causes in Ireland separately. The 
situation in that particular country would presumably affect decisions taken by the ECB 
much more under the latter approach.  
What should the ECB do? Should it base its decisions on the area-wide averages of 
inflation and growth or should it attempt to minimise the (weighted) average of national 
welfare losses resulting from national inflation and growth rates? In our previous   
research (Gros and Hefeker, 2002), we provided a first step towards an answer by 
showing the extent to which these two choices would lead to different policies, even in a 
world where the preferences regarding inflation and unemployment are identical, but 
where there are differences in the monetary transition mechanism. We developed a 
simple model, based on the standard Barro-Gordon model for monetary policy in which 
the monetary authority aims to minimise unemployment and inflation. To this, standard 
model we added the possibility that the transmission of monetary policy differs among 
member countries.  
In order to focus on the issue, we considered the ECB as a homogeneous body where all 
members of the governing body have the same objective. This is in contrast to recent 
work that focussed on the impact that nationally oriented policy-makers within the ECB 
board have on the common monetary policy in the euro area (Aksoy, de Grauwe and 
Dewachter, 2002; Berger and de Haan, 2002). Nevertheless, we considered two 
different objective functions: namely the minimisation of a simple euro-area wide 
objective function and the minimisation of a weighted sum of national welfare losses 
(see also de Grauwe, 2000). It turns out that the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy plays an important role in the difference between the two possible ways of 
aggregating member states’ preferences over monetary policy. Thus, the kind of 
decision-making mechanism in which monetary policy in the ECB is based makes a 
fundamental difference for the member countries.  
Notice that a policy directed at national developments and taking transmission 
differences into account would be a less active policy than one oriented at average 
values. Because the variance of the transmission is taken into account as well, and not 
only the average value, the policy would be less active. Therefore, monetary policy 
should be less active in a monetary union where transmission is asymmetric.21 The 
reason is that, if the ECB adopted a European-wide perspective only, by considering 
average values of unemployment in all members’ countries (even if this is a weighted 
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 There is, however, an inflation-increasing effect stemming from a stronger time-consistency problem. 
This is the case if there is a positive correlation across countries between the transmission mechanism of 
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average), it would imply that those countries whose transmission of monetary policy is 
far away from the average would suffer. If monetary policy in these areas is much more 
effective than on average, even a little bit of expansive monetary policy would have 
strong effects, implying that they experience a higher volatility of inflation and 
employment. Countries that have a monetary policy that is much less effective than 
average would have the same problem, because for them the monetary policy would be 
too inactive. These countries would benefit more if monetary policy would not only be 
looking at the average rates of unemployment but take the welfare losses of the country 
more into account. If, as can be assumed, countries welfare losses are more than 
proportionally higher if they are further away from full employment (they have convex 
loss functions), these outliers are not adequately treated by simply averaging the values 
of employment for Europe and addressing these averages with monetary policy. Thus, 
monetary policy would be less active than in the alternative scenario.  
The normative implication is that in this case, the outliers should be given more weight 
in the considerations of the ECB. In other words, the ECB should base its policy on the 
weighted sum of the welfare losses that member countries experience, instead of 
formulating a European-wide objective function for monetary policy. This would take 
better care of the concerns of the outliers than simply averaging. (Of course, the outliers 
would be weighted according to their relative importance in terms of population or 
GDP.) This mechanism would adequately take into account that countries which exhibit 
a widely divergent transmission of monetary policy could not be well served with a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ monetary policy, based on the average transmission. The upshot of the 
analysis is that such an alternative mechanism could increase the average (expected) 
welfare of all member countries in Euroland. 
Restructuring the ECB? 
This positive result and its normative implication being stated, the interesting question it 
poses (where more research is certainly needed), is how this should be done. Could one 
think of institutional structures for the ECB that would make it more likely for the ECB 
to follow the approach suggested by our analysis? 
At the moment, the ECB board consists of executive members (six) and national 
representatives (which are currently 12 governors). All are required by the statutes of 
the ECB to act with a truly European perspective, but the general impression is that only 
the six Executive Board members have such a perspective. The majority of the other 12 
members are expected to follow national interests or at least take them into account 
when forming their opinions. (Meade and Sheets, 2002, seem to be the only ones who 
actually provide some evidence for this widely held view).  
Therefore, especially with a view towards enlargement, it has been argued that the 
ECB’s decision-making body must be reformed. The prospect of there being not 12 but 
maybe 25 member countries, and thus a Governing Council with over 30 members, is 
considered as unworkable (see Berger, 2002). A group of more than 30 will have 
difficulties in reaching decisions in the extremely short time spans required by fast-DANIEL GROS & CARSTEN HEFEKER 
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moving global financial markets.22 Simple efficiency considerations suggest that a 
different governing structure should be found for the ECB. 
Consider the present situation of 18 members, comprised of six board members and 12 
national governors. Assume that the president proposes an interest-rate change that is 
then voted upon. This requires that there are nine members in favour of this decision 
(the president having two votes in case of a tie). If one assumes that all the members of 
the Executive Board have the same position, they need to find only three national 
representatives who share their opinion, i.e. only 25% of the governors to reach a 
decision. This situation will change dramatically with enlargement. If the EMU is 
enlarged by only five members, the board must find six governors to share their view to 
reach a decision (35.3% of the total); with 12 new members they will need the support 
of nine governors (37.5%); and if 15 countries join the EMU (thus including the current 
opt-outs) the Executive Board needs 11 governors (40.7%) on its side (see Baldwin et 
al., 2000). In addition, it would take much more time to decide. Imagine that 27 
governors and the president each make an opening statement of only ten minutes. In this 
case nearly five hours will have passed before any discussion, let alone before voting 
can even begin.  
Recognising that a Governing Council of over 30 members would be unwieldy, the 
European Council of Nice agreed on a simplified procedure to make some changes in 
the membership of the ECB governing bodies. It also asked the ECB to make a concrete 
proposal on how to change one paragraph of its statutes. This seems to have set in 
motion an acrimonious discussion within the Eurosystem, about which very little is 
known outside central banking circles. At the very last minute, i.e. in late 2002, the ECB 
came up with a proposal that had been elaborated in strict secrecy. 
The essence of the official proposal is to divide all euro-area member countries into 
three groups measured by economic size, which in turn, is measured by a new 
composite indicator: 5/6 GDP and 1/6 ‘aggregate balance of the monetary and financial 
institutions’. Each group would have only a limited number of votes, which would in 
practise mean that countries would have to rotate as follows: 
Group 1: four votes (five members, so the voting frequency is 80%); 
Group 2: eight votes (the number of members varies, so the voting frequency falls as the 
euro area expands – the maximum is 8/11 or 72.27%); and 
Group 3: three votes (the voting frequency falls as the euro area expands – the 
maximum is 50%). 
                                                 
22 Currently, the monetary policy-setting organisation, the Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
is composed of 18 persons. There are six members of the Executive Board and 12 national representatives 
(the governors of the national central banks of the EMU members). The Board is selected jointly by the 
Council of Ministers, while the 12 national representatives are chosen by their respective governments. 
Assuming that the current non-members of the EMU and all the new members will ultimately join, the 
Council will be enlarged to 33 members: six board members and 27 national representatives. This implies 
that 33 members would have to decide on monetary policy for the euro-area, with each member having 
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Which countries would be in each group? Table 8 below gives a possible distribution 
for three different hypotheses about the membership of the euro area. 
Table 8. Distribution of countries into groups  
Euro-28 Euro-25   
(Euro-28 without 
BG, RO and 
TUR)  
Euro-22 
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United Kingdom 
France 
Italy 
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United Kingdom 
France 
Italy 
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The Netherlands 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Austria 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Poland 
Portugal 
Turkey 
Greece 
Luxembourg 
Finland 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Austria 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Poland 
Portugal 
Greece 
Luxembourg 
Finland 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
 
Belgium 
Austria 
Ireland 
Poland 
Portugal 
Greece 
Luxembourg 
Finland 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Slovak Republic 
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3
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Romania 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Bulgaria 
Lithuania 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Estonia 
Malta 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Lithuania 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Estonia 
Malta 
Slovenia 
Lithuania 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Estonia 
Malta 
Notes: Based on 2002 data. Due to the limited availability of the data on the aggregate balance sheets of 
the monetary and financial institutions in the candidate countries, the ordering shown is only 
approximate. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
One of the reasons why it was felt that enlargement requires a change in the 
composition of the decision-making body of the ECB was that it is widely assumed that 
enlargement will increase the discrepancies between the economic and political weights 
within the Governing Council of the ECB. Most of the present candidates are relatively 
small in economic terms, but their representatives (the governors of the NCBs are often 
perceived that way) would have the same weight as that of Germany, whose economy is 
larger in order of magnitude. DANIEL GROS & CARSTEN HEFEKER 
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Can this perception be quantified and verified? Economic weights could be defined as 
GDP shares and the political weights could be defined as being equal for all countries to 
1/n, with the number of countries in the EMU. Using this definition, it is not evident 
that the discrepancies that exist at present will be worse in a larger EMU. Indeed, if one 
takes the sum of the squared differences between the economic and political weights as 
a measure of discrepancies, one arrives at the opposite result: the discrepancies between 
the economic and political weights are lower in a larger euro area than in the current 
euro-12 club. Table 9 below provides the results of some illustrative calculations. It is 
apparent that all the larger euro area compositions considered here actually lead to a 
lower discrepancy between economic and political weights than the current euro-12 
grouping. (See the Annex 3 to Gros et al., 2002, for further details and additional 
calculations that take into account the Executive Board.) 
 
Table 9. Mismatch between economic and political weights 
  Three alternative economic weights 
 GDP  Population  ECB  shares 
Euro-12 9,5  10,3  8,9 
Euro-15 7,4  7,8  7,1 
Euro-25 7,0  9,2  5,4 
Euro-27 7,2  9,4  5,7 
Euro-25-UK 8,0  10,8  6,1 
Source: Own calculations. Each entry represents the sum of the squared differences (times 100) between 
the political weights (defined as 1/n) and one of the different economic weights used here: GDP, 
population and ECB shares (the average of GDP and population weights). 
 
An alternative 
The problem regarding the size of the Governing Council of the ECB is real. How 
should it be solved? The approach proposed here (see also Gros et al., 2002 and 
Euromonitor, 2001) is quite simple: do not change the composition of the Governing 
Council, but ensure that it meets less often and thus re-define the division of labour 
between the Executive Board and the Governing Council. The tasks of the Governing 
Council should be to set the direction for monetary policy, decide on proposals from the 
Executive Board, constitute a platform for the exchange of views on the eurozone 
economy and monitor the work of the Executive Board. These tasks can be performed 
efficiently even by a rather large body and the representation of all member countries in 
the Governing Council provides the appropriate legitimacy for such a controlling 
function. The Executive Board should develop into a decision-making body in its own 
right, but so far its actions have been tightly controlled by the Governing Council.  
The Governing Council can be regarded as the ‘sovereign institution’ in European 
monetary policy. It derives its sovereignty from the fact that it represents all the member ASYMMETRIES IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND 
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states and pools expert knowledge from the national central banks. All powers within 
the ECB can eventually be traced back to the Governing Council. This also applies to 
the Executive Board, all of whose powers at present are directly delegated by the 
Governing Council.  
This proposal does not affect the primacy of the Governing Council – all powers would 
continue to emanate from it. It does, however, reduce the right of the Governing 
Council to control every single act of the Executive Board. Thus the Executive Board 
could come to enjoy a certain degree of discretion, which is justified by the fact that it 
represents not just the aggregation of individual state interests but rather a ‘general 
European monetary interest’. 
The division of labour proposed here is based on one key difference between NCB 
presidents and members of the Executive Board, which is an objective one: i.e. their 
respective information bases. Board members concentrate on area-wide aggregates in 
their daily work and are likely to be in closer contact with global financial markets than 
the NCB presidents. The latter perform a wide variety of functions at the national level: 
they supervise the national banking system; they are influential participants in national 
debates about almost all economic policy issues, etc. By contrast, the members of the 
Executive Board can concentrate almost exclusively on issues related to the formulation 
of the common monetary policy stance.  
This information advantage of the Executive Board members is likely to be most 
pronounced in the area of financial market developments. Area-wide data on real 
economic variables, such as output, result essentially from the summation of national 
data that becomes available at different points in time and most of which contain small 
national idiosyncrasies. Financial markets are much more integrated than the markets 
for goods and services, so that an observer at the centre does not need to have detailed 
local knowledge. Some national idiosyncrasies persist in financial markets at the retail 
level, but the movement towards a unified market is stronger for financial services than 
for goods or most other services.  
By contrast, the markets for most goods and services, in particular labour, retain a lot of 
distinctive national characteristics as documented here. For example, the average area-
wide inflation rate may be influenced by a change in indirect taxes or a re-basing in one 
member country. At times such a change can produce an effect that may not even be 
known outside the country and whose importance is difficult to judge unless one knows 
the local situation in some detail. A major labour market reform could increase the 
registered unemployment in an important member country. The NCB governor is the 
person best qualified to inform the ECB about the implications of the event and whether 
it could bias the euro area average. 
This view implies that there may well be a natural division of labour between the NCB 
presidents and the Executive Board members: the latter can contribute their knowledge 
about the state of financial markets whereas the former can contribute local knowledge 
about the real economy, including prospects for output and labour markets. This 
division of labour has one immediate consequence – financial markets move much more 
quickly than the markets for goods and services, which in the final analysis determine 
output and employment. Interest rates and stock markets can collapse or soar in a matter 
of weeks, if not days, but a fall in consumer demand usually takes months to develop DANIEL GROS & CARSTEN HEFEKER 
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(and to be recognised as such). Supply-side shocks, such as an acceleration of 
productivity, take place over an even longer time horizon. 
The different comparative advantages of NCB presidents and members of the Executive 
Board suggest a simple approach to the reform of the ECB in view of enlargement. As 
the number of euro-area member countries increases, the Governing Council, which 
would continue to comprise all the NCB presidents, should meet less often and 
concentrate on strategic decisions. To be concrete, the Governing Council could meet 
only once every quarter. These meetings could involve a longer exchange of views on 
the state of the economy. That would in turn allow the Governing Council to formulate 
general, strategic guidelines for monetary policy, leaving the day-to-day execution to 
the Executive Board in Frankfurt.  
This approach has the advantage that it maintains the representation of all the member 
countries in the highest decision-making body of the ECB. There is a strong political 
demand for full representation that should not be dismissed. It also has a rational 
background: as argued above, local information is essential to fully understand the 
economic situation even at the area-wide level. This same perception is also shared by 
the wider public. Tough decisions by the ECB are thus more likely to be accepted as 
necessary and legitimate if all the countries are represented in the governing body of the 
ECB that makes strategic decisions. In this context, by ‘strategic’ we mean those 
decisions that have a long term and more profound impact on the economy.  
During normal times, the general public is unlikely to even notice the week-to-week or 
even month-to-month changes in monetary policy interest rates. Monetary policy 
becomes an issue only when tough decisions have to be made. This is most likely to 
happen when output falls and unemployment goes up but inflation remains high (as at 
present). In such a situation, the choice takes on great political importance. Should 
monetary policy become accommodating in order to sustain employment or restrictive 
to achieve price stability? These are the issues that concern the general public rather 
questions such as whether the appropriate neutral stance implies an interest rate half a 
percentage point higher or whether rates should be cut in a month instead of today. This 
type of decision can be left to a smaller group even if it is not perceived to be currently 
representative of all countries. 
All rotation schemes face the same dilemma – while they may be fair on average, this 
fact is irrelevant at any given moment in time. If a country that is hit by a crisis does not 
have a representative on the ECB Governing Council, the public is unlikely to 
magnanimously accept its bad luck. Unpopular decisions of the ECB could then quickly 
be perceived as illegitimate, because the ECB ‘does not know what our problems are’. 
An asymmetric rotation scheme that differentiates, for example, between larger and 
smaller countries would reduce the likelihood that this would happen for a large 
country; but it would raise the general suspicion that ECB policy is being determined by 
the interest of the restricted group of countries that happens to be represented at any one 
time in the Governing Council.23  
                                                 
23 The example of the US Federal Reserve Board, where there is an asymmetry in the sense that the 
Governor of the New York Federal Reserve District is the only member to have a permanent seat in the 
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There are several reasons why this obvious solution is not a likely outcome. First, one 
could argue that the dispersion of the power to vote on monetary policy protects the 
independence of the board to some degree. Presumably, pressures from member states, 
interest groups or the public at large can be less easily rejected by a small group. If 
voting power and responsibility are more diluted, it is more difficult to exert pressure on 
the Council. Secondly, it is unlikely that member states will formally renounce their 
right to co-determine monetary policy by sending governors into the Council. Thirdly, 
as in the case of assigning voting weights to member countries, this solution would 
violate the ‘one country, one vote’ principle.  
From the labour market perspective, there is the additional problem that this would be 
an issue if the Executive Board members adopt a perspective that does not take into 
account the national developments. Such a solution would increase efficiency but may 
risk that the asymmetric effects of monetary policy on national entities is neglected. 
Therefore, apart from political reasons, there is also an economic argument to preserve 
national influences on the common monetary policy. 
What other solutions are there to preserve the efficiency of monetary policy-making? 
Reform proposals that are currently discussed come under two headings: representation 
and rotation (see Eichengreen and Ghironi, 2001 and Berger, 2002). Representation is 
the system operated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Under this system, 
countries would be grouped into four or five groups, and have one vote together. The 
chair would represent the position of the group. If countries in one group should diverge 
in terms of inflation, growth, income level etc., the problem of finding a solution would 
be transferred from the Council to the group. If the ‘one country, one vote’ principle is 
kept, this would imply that the chair’s position is bound by what the majority of his/her 
constituencies voted.
24
 Although intriguing in principle, there are several problems with 
this solution. How would the groups be formed? How would the chair be determined 
                                                                                                                                               
Open Market Committee, does not constitute a counter-argument. This asymmetry is due to the 
importance of New York as a financial centre, not because the New York (NY) District is in a different 
league in terms of population or GDP. This implies also that the NY Federal Governor is more likely to 
represent the interests of the US financial sector (witness the rescue of Long-Term Capital Management 
[LTCM]) rather than the interests of the Federal Reserve District of NY, which encompasses a number of 
quite different states. In the case of the ECB, the Board, based in Frankfurt, would subsume the role of the 
NY Federal Governor. Yet the Governors of Federal Reserve Districts do not have the same prominent 
role in regional politics as do the presidents of NCBs in Europe, partially because their constituencies 
encompass several states (some Federal District boundaries even cut across states). 
The example of the US also does not justify the inclusion of the total aggregate balance sheet of monetary 
financial institutions in the indicator of size that should be used, according to the ECB proposal, to 
classify countries in different categories. The importance of a financial centre is not determined by the 
size of its balance sheets but by the complexity of the operations it undertakes. The huge amounts of 
savings deposits in Luxembourg banks on their own do not constitute a reason to put this country in a 
different category. Most of these deposits come from other member countries and are often controlled 
directly or indirectly by other EU financial institutions. Luxembourg cannot be compared to New York, 
since it is not the financial centre of the euro area. 
24
 In the IMF, the chair is not bound to represent the position of members, i.e. this is not an ‘imperative’ 
system.  DANIEL GROS & CARSTEN HEFEKER 
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(would it rotate, would one country always hold it)? How would the members determine 
their joint position (would they vote or find their position by ‘consensus’)? 
To minimise transaction costs, it would probably make sense to group countries 
according to their expected economic position, i.e. based on close similarities in 
business cycles or in economic structure. But a two-step decision-making process need 
not necessarily be more efficient than one where all members and the Executive Board 
come together jointly. Decision costs could be just as high.  
Moreover, nothing would ensure that economically similar countries are also 
characterised by similar labour market developments or similar transmission of 
monetary policy. In general, structuring such groups on the basis of one criterion (even 
if a sensible one), would potentially entail the risk of neglecting other factors. It would 
thus be difficult to find a perfect group, especially when taking the usually neglected 
influences into account. 
The alternative solution is one that would follow the system of the Federal Reserve 
Board in the US. In addition to a group of seven permanent board members (the 
president, the vice-president and five other persons), there is a group of 12 regional 
federal reserve bank governors who take turns to fill the other five seats in the Council. 
New York, as the financial centre, has a permanent seat, and Chicago and Cleveland 
(historically minor financial centres) take turns to fill one other seat. The remaining nine 
banks rotate through the remaining three seats.  
If one was to follow this example, obvious questions would be raised with regard to 
whether there should be permanent seats for some economies and which countries that 
would include? Germany and France would be obvious candidates for permanent seats, 
but what about Italy and Spain or later the UK and maybe Poland? Should countries be 
formed into groups that are allocated one seat so that this solution would comprise 
elements of the alternative discussed above? If not, should countries rotate randomly or 
according to some mechanism that gives larger members more time in the seats? If care 
is not taken concerning the relative sizes of the countries, situations could arise in which 
no large member is holding a seat, returning to the problem of over-representation by 
small members.  
Again, the same argument made about forming groups can be made against rotation. A 
simple rotation model is clearly less adequate for the eurozone than it is for the US, 
which exhibits less regional divergence than the enlarged EU certainly will. Rotation 
does not take into account the possibility that the structure of shocks could be very 
different. At any point in time, there is the possibility that the affected member is not a 
member of the Council and therefore its shocks are only imperfectly taken into account 
(by the Executive Board). This, as previously noted, is particularly a concern for the 
smaller (and accession) countries. Although this is a general problem, it becomes 
especially important if those countries with extreme differences in the transmission of 
monetary policy are not members of the decision-making body of the central bank. 
Therefore, although there are currently different proposals on the table none seems to be 
the ideal solution from the perspective of labour markets. As we have argued, the 
insufficient flexibility of labour markets in Europe and the asymmetric transmission of 
monetary policy suggest that a solution should be found where the interests of the 
outliers are appropriately taken into account. Although on efficiency grounds, a more ASYMMETRIES IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND 
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centralised ECB is advisable, this is less so on the basis of our findings. This may bring 
some delays and efficiencies into the decision-making process, but our analysis suggests 
that it at least has the advantage that national characteristics are appropriately taken into 
account when setting common policy. It should, in fact, be desirable that national 
interests are taken into account.  
Whether this is done, however, by ‘true Europeans’ or by national representatives does 
not matter very much. Therefore, a centralised model may be a better compromise 
between efficiency and appropriate care for the national influences than a rotating 
scheme or the formation of groups. A strong Executive Board can take national 
developments into account at least in principle. Selecting some national representatives 
from a larger group instead runs the risk that these representatives only use their chance 
to implement their own national interests for as long as they are on the Executive Board. 
A clear break, with a new defined role for the Executive Board, could be a more 
workable solution.  
It should also be clear that such a solution would have to be reconsidered periodically. 
In as much as transmissions of monetary policy become more similar across the union, 
the need for taking asymmetries into account would obviously disappear. Taking these 
developments into account and reacting appropriately is another argument that supports 
a centralised solution for the ECB. A technically competent Executive Board is 
probably better suited for such a task than a handful of national governors. 
4.  Policy recommendations and conclusions 
This paper has sought to document the development of European labour markets over 
recent years. Although there has been a lot of convergence in a macro sense, i.e. overall 
wage increase, the labour market outcomes in terms of employment and unemployment 
rates are far from having converged; in some cases there is even some divergence to 
report. Experience of the behaviour of labour market participants so far suggests that 
there is little reason to expect that a significant change will occur because of the 
introduction of a common currency. 
The reason for this is the still considerable difference in the functioning of labour 
markets at the micro level, i.e. in terms of labour market regulations and social security 
systems. This difference means that a common monetary policy has, and will continue 
to have for the foreseeable future, asymmetric outcomes. Confronted with this dilemma, 
what should the ECB do? We do not have a solution that would somehow resolve the 
problem. But we argue that one should not ignore this challenge by basing policy only 
on euro area averages. In our view, extreme outcomes (very high inflation or high 
growth shortfalls) should have a large weight in the ECB’s average. This prescription 
follows naturally from the fact that the EU is not a political union, so one cannot 
construct a Union-wide social welfare function. For the time being, the guiding 
principle of the EU’s institutions must be to look after the sum of the national welfare 
functions. In almost all of our models, these welfare functions are convex, implying that 
large deviations from the mean count more than small ones. This is the basic reason 
why it is not just enough to look at the average. 44 
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